If property owners consistently come back to car traffic, unshadowed views, unobstructed views, noise level, local character, air quality, drainage, and water quality -- roughly in that order -- when these things arise, then that's a useful hierarchy. If they tend to organize in groups in order to try to externalize those costs in order to get the added market value without being contractually obligated for it, then two solutions present themselves.
Concerned citizens might be willing to pay surcharges for offloading each of the local development nuisances to another part of the city, up to the point at which it's not worth it to them to pay another benjamin rather than just accept a little more traffic or high-rise construction in the neighborhood. Those payments will not be spread out over the whole city's tax base, however. They will accrue to the neighborhoods that are accepting the increases in square footage.
On the other hand they might acknowledge that they want these resources/nuisances wastefully allocated rather than responsibly allocated because they thought there was a political mechanism to step outside the property value system and game it.
If they don't want the allocation management to be rigged, then people who buy property shouldn't expect control over through traffic easement unless some offsite control of it is explicit in the title deed of the property they bought, and expect to explicitly pay more for it in the bidding process.
In the long run, whether it's priced in in that way or on an annual basis, this "MAX Lane" approach would streamline and make things simpler in the development process than "move out if you don't like change cuz cities change." In particular, it would directly erase the informal, invisible fee transfers that annually raise the market valuation of access to property in a quiet (but politically vocal) wealthy enclave in the form of offloaded nuisances. It would continue to encourage the property value gains that come from sheer prime location and local growth, without damaging those. And it would lower the lure of free-riding since it uses the development nuisance offset payments to 'net out' that ownership incentive with every other part of the local city or county at the same time.